M. A. Torben Kölpin


Torben Kölpin studierte Dienstleistungsmanagement mit dem Schwerpunkt soziale Dienstleistungen an der Universität Vechta. Anschließend wechselte er 2015 an die Hochschule Emden/Leer, um den Master Business Management  zu absolvieren. Diesen schloss er im Jahr 2017 erfolgreich ab. Seit April 2017 nimmt er einen Lehrauftrag an der Universität Vechta im Studiengang Management Sozialer Dienstleistungen wahr.

Sein Forschungsschwerpunkt liegt primär im Bereich der Unterrepräsentanz von Frauen in Führungspositionen in sozialen Dienstleistungen.


Cooperation and Attrition in Online-Experiments Gerald Eisenkopf, Torben Kölpin


Our paper investigates a causal relationship between cooperation and task motivation in an online experiment. We put our participants in groups of four and confront them with simple but tedious work tasks to receive payments. As a methodological innovation, we encourage attrition with decreasing net payments over time. Participants can take their money and leave anytime, while others continue. Two of our three treatments allow for cooperation. After completing a work task, participants can voluntarily invest their earnings into a common pool that generates additional benefits for each of four group members. In one of these two treatments, the members observe the decision of a randomly chosen leader before they invest themselves, while all members decide simultaneously in the other treatment. We compare these results with a Control Treatment that does not allow for cooperation. We observe that successful cooperation delays attrition. Furthermore, we find that uncooperative behavior early in the experiment reduces task motivation of fellow group members. Participants sacrifice the economic benefit of an additional task and drop out prematurely. Our results suggest a complementary relationship between different sources of job motivation. Overall motivation declines if social preferences are poorly addressed.


Attrition, Online-Experiment, Task Motivation, Voluntary Contribution, Cooperation

Leadership and Cooperation in growing teams Gerald Eisenkopf, Torben Kölpin


We study how growing teams affects leadership effectiveness and intra-group cooperation. We place people in groups of six and subdivided them in two teams of three players. In each team, the members voluntarily contribute to a club good. At the end of a round they receive information about the contributions in their own team and in the other team. In one of the two teams, the members observe the contribution of a randomly chosen leader before they decide themselves. Two treatments allow for migration between the teams. In one of these two treatments participants control access to their team with a voting process. By design, participants can achieve the efficient outcome only if they all move into one team. We compare the results with two treatments which vary team size exogenously. The results show a virtuous circle between leadership, team size and contributions. Leaders foster contributions which encourages migration into their teams. In turn, larger teams experience even more courageous leadership and higher contributions. Nevertheless, the dismissal of potential newcomers in the treatment with voting suggests that team members see a trade-off between team size and contributions. They sacrifice economic benefits from potential entrants in order to maintain intra-team cooperation.



Public Goods Game, Group Change, Cooperation, Group Size, Leading-by-example

It wasn't me - unfair decision making and not standing up for it Robert Gillenkirch, Torben Kölpin, Vanessa Mertins


Managers must regularly take unpleasant decisions which affect others.  In such situations, individuals are known to shift blame. We use two variants of the dictator game experiment: in the first setting, decision-makers choose the allocation and can lie about their responsibility for the resulting token distribution. In the second game, the allocation is decided by rolling a die while dictators can choose to misrepresent the result.  Our results confirm that dictators who favor themselves more also lie more often to conceal their responsibility. This effect is stronger for women than men, although women generally treat recipients more generously.



Lying, Responsibility, Decision-making, Dictator-game, Gender differences



November 2019: Personnel, Innovation, and Education Economists Network Meeting in Nürnberg (Germany) Forschungsvortrag
September 2019: 14th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics in Kiel (Germany) Forschungsvortrag
September 2019: Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (GfeW) in Düsseldorf (Germany) Forschungsvortrag
Januar 2019: Vechta Workshop on Social Behavior in Vechta (Germany) Posterpräsentation
September 2018: Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (GfeW) in Paderborn (Germany) Forschungsvortrag
Juni 2018: Maastricht Behavioral Experimental Economics Symposium (M-BEES) in Maastricht (Netherlands) Beihörer
November 2017: Personnel, Innovation, and Education Economists Network Meeting in Wuppertal (Germany) Forschungsvortrag


Februar 2020: Academic Writing with Prof. Dr. Oliver Fabel
September 2019: Identification Through Experiments: The Case of Gender Differences in the Labor Market and the study of Charitable Giving in Bergen (Norway) with Prof. Dr. Lise Vesterlund
Juli 2018: Summer School on Economic Psychology and Experimental Economics in Saratov (Russia) with Prof. Dr. Ido Erev & Michael Bar-Eli and more
Februar 2018: zTree-Course in Konstanz (Germany) with Prof. Dr. Urs Fischbacher
September 2017: VHB-Pro-Dok. Experimental Research and Behavioral Decision Making in Berlin (Germany) with Prof. Dr. Christian D. Schade

Letzte Aenderung: 08.04.2021 · Seite drucken


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